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GLOBAL ECO NO M IC INSTITUTIONS and NORTH-SOUTH LINKS  
Reflections from Keith Griffin's Agenda
Reginald Herbold Green
Rabbit, Rabbit where are you going?
I am going out to kill the elephant.
Rabbit, Rabbit can you really do that?
Well, I'll try ... and try again.
- Tanzanian Lake Zone Proverb
L
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"May You Live In Interesting Times"
Keith Griffin, like Gerry Helleiner is an iconoclast. He does not suppose that relative 
longevity and general acceptance or conventional wisdom are a justification for following the 
Spanish proverb "Let there be new things". If anything, quite the reverse.
In respect to the Chinese curse "May you live in interesting times", the "Reformer's Agenda" 
at least implicitly (e.g. simply by tabling the gap in comparative purchasing power of A and B 
countries) answers that the times are already all too interesting and - not only for poor people 
and countries - likely to become much more so if "business as usual" (as it became usual over 
1980-1990) is the order of the decade.
The first main thrust of the Agenda is that the North-South official resource transfer system 
needs to be, and both technically and politically can be, transformed with the largest single 
element a social security/safe net automatic mechanism. While a number of questions on 
details and modalities and more basic questions on who should administer and whether or to 
what extent one can equate poor economy governments and poor households, this major 
challenge to the present transfer system is an idea whose time has come.
2The second main thrust is for wide use of mutual benefit cost sharing contracts to - e.g. cover 
environmental protection programming in poor countries, extend public health services to 
reduce global as well as national disease risk. That too is an idea whose time for serious 
application has come, whether justified in terms of external economies market failure or 
mutual interest.
The other elements proposed for official transfers are:
a. North payments for economic harm (deviations from economic liberalism plus - in the case 
of high level personnel - for practising it) to poor Southern countries;
b. Emergency survival (and presumably post crisis reconstruction and livelihood 
rehabilitation) on a quasi global insurance fund basis;
c. residual bilateral official transfer programmes to serve resource transferor international 
economic interests;
d. perhaps a vestigial role for the World Bank and Regional Development Banks;
e. no technical assistance as such (except under "c") with transfers freely usable by recipients 
to buy it if desired.
The second element is indeed one which urgently needs - and probably can get - more, more 
efficiently used resources but is unfortunately only tacked-on as a footnote to the agenda.
The first is ill-served by treating both liberal acceptance of migrant professionals and illiberal 
rejection of migrant unskilled workers as justifying payments. More basically unlike the Safety 
Net, the transformed Emergency Programme and the Mutual Interest Contracts it is not an 
idea which can conceivably be made operational over 1995-2005. 2045 would be an 
optimistic date because (as is not true for the other elements) it really does require at least 
Global Economic Confederalism with a strong global economic judiciary able to levy fines, not 
simply cut off access to benefits to contract violators (e.g. a WTO judicial process on asserted 
violations).
Realistically, the third is likely to be rather more substantial than the agenda suggests. While 
in the right direction the last two - wipe-out - elements appear distinctly too extreme, at least
for 2005 or 2015.
3The basic challenges to this Agenda are:
1. Is external debt write-down/write-off really an area of insignificant importance in respect 
of net transfers to poor countries?
2. Is the creation of UNDP as an imperial, single channel transfer operator/coordinator 
desirable?
3. Even in respect of transfers, the enterprise and individual taken together are much larger 
than the official - even for some very poor countries. Are these transfers of no concern to 
the Global Economic Institution System?
4. The dominant external economic relations of most poor countries (and all others) are 
trade. Why - in a paper paying homage to liberalism in the free market sense, is trade (e.g. 
GATT/WTO) and trade facilitation (e.g. EMF) - notable by its total absence?
5. Can the North-South transfer vector usefully be abstracted from the overall Global 
Economic Institution System including its North-North and South-South components?
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6. Can the tensions (or worse?) between ultra market liberalism and a deep commitment to 
equity and ending absolute poverty (placing a safety net) be assumed to be soluble by a 
few simple operational modalities - the cost sharing contracts to correct market failure - as 
is done in this Agenda.
7. Is the Agenda presented as a type of macro mutual benefit - cost sharing contract for early 
negotiation and substantial implementation by 2005? Or as an element in an implicit world 
economic confederal governance vision for 2045 or later? Different elements appear to 
vary as to whether they could fall under the first rubric or only within the second.
n.
Toward Global Social Security To End Absolute Poverty
There is growing acceptance that absolute poverty is absolutely evil and is of concern to rich
as well as absolutely poor at global as well as national levels. The case is not merely
humanitarian plus CNN factor. Adam Smith's "moral economy" case that no nation can be
4great and prosperous the majority of whose citizens are poor and miserable has economic 
(output and demand), law and order and sociological (the costs of a violently fragmented 
social order) as well as normative.
To the extent acceptance can be strengthened, reasonable (in terms of costs and probable 
results) global social security/safety net programmes are discussible today and potentially 
negotiable over the next few years.
Certainly as the basic element in official transfers a set of automatic negative income tax type 
payments would have several advantages:
a. the broadest acceptance of official transfers relates to poverty alleviation and reduction;
b. wiping out the whimsical supposition that official transfers would flow 1:1 into additional 
fixed investment (a most implausible proposition and one likely to fail on any welfare 
criteria except that of a simple Feldman model or a Mahalanubis model ignoring human 
investment) would free intellectual resources for more useful purposes and end the need 
for creative accounting and novella writing by transferors and recipients alike;
c. the automatic transfer formula would - presumably - increase recipient weight in decisions 
on transfer use and reduce the mind-boggling weight of too many, too intrusive, too 
detailed one-way ('donors' are rarely found) conditionality on too many transactions.
Broadly speaking the agenda proposal of 3 classes of payers, a no pay no receive class and 3 
classes of recipients appears both reasonable and broadly negotiable. However, the use of 
Comparative Purchasing Power calculations for classification is probably an unhappy choice - 
in the case of several South countries the absolute and relative levels are at least as 
contentious as official GDP (or more appropriately GNP?). More crucially no proposal which 
excludes - inter alia - China, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Cameroon from its 
list of transfer receiving poor countries is either intuitively plausible or politically practicable. 
Correcting to include them would double recipient country population but would not alter the 
fact that large population poor countries would gain and smaller, less poor ones receive less 
official transfers.
Barring global economic confederalism a literal tax system is not practicable. But a 0.25% to 
0.33% negotiated payment compact might well be attainable and - barring gross USA 
backsliding on paying could hold up.
5A more basic problem is that national social security/safety net systems relate to and make 
payments to individuals largely to augment consumption (alleviate). Enabling spending - e.g. 
education, infrastructure, fiscal environment for employers - is not normally seen as social 
security. It is seen as social policy in the Mediaeval Christian, Confucian, Bismarckian, 
Communist and Colonial systems but not in the Western European conservative Social 
Democratic/welfare capitalist or the USA "last resort" ones. But presumably international 
transfers would go to poor country governments not individual poor households and would 
not be (or should not be) conditional on total passing on as individual transfers with no 
allocation to poor household production/eaming/livelihood enabling including human and 
infrastructural investment (e.g. basic health, education, water, rural transport, extension 
services, communications) as well as facilitating relatively fair market access.
In fact, conditionality cannot be evaded. Apart from normative considerations proposals that 
would result in large unconditional, unaccountable cash transfers to the present regimes in -
e.g. - Haiti and Zaire would be (and would deserve to be) politically unsaleable. Conceivably 
an analogue to the old IMF "low conditionality" tranches - a reasonable ex ante outline of how 
resources would be used in ways relevant to poverty alleviation reduction and an overall 
verbal report supported by the audited accounts of any reasonable national budgetary system 
ex post could both prevent gross and limit marginal 'unintended' use and preserve the basic 
responsibility of recipient governments to determine how to use the resources in the interests 
of their poor households. But to suppose that conditionality can be nil or that negotiating an 
agreed, user friendly, transferor reassuring frame will be easy is to live in a false paradise that 
will explode in proponents faces once detailed pre-implementation negotiations begin.
III.
Mutual Benefit Cost Sharing Contracts
These are transfers but not aid (or social security). They arise in cases in which action by a (in 
practice) Southern state is perceived as beneficial by it, has large external economies to other 
(Northern and Southern) states and would be unlikely to be affordable to the Southern state. 
Up to the level of its anticipated external economies gain a Northern state is well advised 
economically to negotiate a contract for 'services rendered'.
Environment - specifically global warming, ozone hole, species diversity protection, early 
adoption of generally non-polluting technology especially in industry and transport, reduction 
of emissions crossing national frontiers (e.g. Cairo to Greece and Italy) are examples. If data
6at the Rio Conference are even accurate as to order of magnitude then up to $5,000 million a 
year in contracts will be needed by 2005.
They may well be more complex than cash for programme, e.g. access at non-cartelised prices 
to non or low polluting technology might feature. Similarly the agenda of any contract could - 
probably should - include transfer recipient priority environmental programmes which may not 
have high Northern priority and domestic resource commitments plus progress commitments 
in a monitorable form. As these would be business deals presumably balanced, multi- 
directionable (on North as well as South) would not raise problems of principle even if - as 
with any large complex contract - there would be devils in agreeing the details.
Environment is of course not the only relevant area - public health and arguably agricultural 
research (especially if small farmer friendly) are others. A possible contract field of some 
interest is protection/compensation of national minorities especially in the context of large 
programmes (e.g. river basin irrigation and power schemes). Whether the Northern interest is 
humanitarian political or economic, some (and certainly some NGOs) do have an interest while 
many Southern governments appear to do little on cost and unilateral intrusiveness grounds. 
Perhaps cost sharing could resolve some the present impasses.
Who should coordinate/service/provide fora for such negotiations is not clear despite Agenda's 
all-purpose advocacy of UNDP as the hegemony of all official transfers. Arguably specialised 
expertise would be helpful as well as links to sectoral programmes which are North-North or 
North-South. That strongly suggests that the UN specialised agencies would be better fora 
and secretariat providers. However, in that case UNEP (and UNIFEM?) would require 
substantial upgrading.
IV. 
Early Warning, Early Support, Early Rehabilitation
Emergency (survival and rehabilitation) programmes - which would logically be the Agenda's 
third front - are treated in passing. Here UNDP coordination - not UN HQ's humanitarian 
division - does make sense.
So does an insurance type system with - say - 10% of basic social security transfer paid as a 
premium (whether via UNDP or in agreed proportions to WFP, UNICEF, WHO, ILO, UNDP 
is a secondary issue). Annual experience reviews would lead to top up calls (or if very
t
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substantial reserves accrued partial premium waivers) with interim borrowing powers to 
bridge gaps.
The need to develop an ongoing approach from early warning and early response through 
initial survival support to rehabilitation and future vulnerability reduction would almost 
certainly be served by the proposed approach. And it would recognise institutionally that 
disasters (natural calamities and man made calamities) do recur and have common 
characteristics so that a one-off approach is markedly unsound.
As with contracts any country not merely the poorest should in principle be eligible.
V.
Paying for Harm
In principle the paying for harm done to the South (by economic or quasi economic policies) is 
sound. In practice two problems arise:
a. short of world economic confederalism it is very hard to envisage how it could be
I
implemented;
b. as the labour case illustrates the realities are both rather more complex than the ultra 
liberal market intellectual parameters suggest and humanitarian instincts suggest harms 
which those parameters would deem mutual benefits.
On a consistent basis almost all labour migration (and emigration to distinguish those for 
whom the move is permanent) that is not based on faulty information will raise the incomes of 
those migrating and the GDP of host countries. Barring rather unlikely efficiency of 
transfer/retraining systems it will hurt competing workers in the host country. Whether it will 
benefit the GNP of the sending country depends in the short term on remittance levels (which 
are high enough to suggest the answer is normally yes) and in the long on whether exporting 
sub-category by sub-category above average personnel has a negative impact on dynamism at 
home overriding remittance gains (arguably yes in some rural areas and in the Philippine and 
Turkish health, education and engineering sectors).
8A snag in this analytical sketch is that it assumes personal pay is equal to social and economic 
value of production. That is a very extreme assumption indeed. Relaxing it may reverse and 
will lower labour exporting country net gains.
In any case totally free migration is simply not negotiable by 2005 (nor one might guess by 
2045 except within fairly homogenous economic groups - not including NAFTA). But mutual 
interest contacts may be negotiable:
a. more transparent, negotiated access conditions;
b. fairer treatment of migrants including portability of social security entitlements;
c. more source country assistance in limiting non-lawtul flows;
d. transfers aimed at employment/livelihood enhancement for poor households in source 
countries.
Easier access to host country citizenship is a human rights and, probably, global/host GNP 
desiderata. Unfortunately it is probably not in source country (GNP and those at home) 
interest because remittances fall rapidly after the first generation.
VI.
Some Doubts: What's Not There
It is not clear there would be no role for merchant bank/joint finance operations parallel to the 
restructured core public transfer system. Shrunken, yes. More specialised, yes. Perhaps with 
EDA and analogous Regional Bank Funds terminated. But both the World Bank and some 
Regional Banks (notably the Asian) are commercially viable at their main windows which 
suggests a continuing role.
The absence of debt write-down/write-off is surprising. Like emergencies crippling 
indebtedness can affect not so poor countries very severely. The logical approach may be 
mutual interest contracts (default, bankruptcy or stagnation enforced by debt service transfers 
far above inflows serve Northern interests very badly). Bank and Fund analysis suggests 
parameters could be found and both by reducing uncertainty and by reducing outflows to the 
North would reduce the need for sharply increased gross inflows.
9VU.
Isolated Hegemony or Integrated Diversity
The Agenda appears to reflect its ancestry as a UNDP thinkpiece. The solution of UNDP's 
coordination-fund raising-operational dilemma by making it a hegemonic (near single channel) 
official transfer collector, distributor - or for mutual interest contracts fora manager and 
negotiation monitor is breathtaking in its imperial reach. The World Bank's efforts to create a 
World Bank World' (largely by coordination) fade into moderation and pluralism in 
comparison.
Surely specialisation and division of labour as well as competition suggest a diversity of 
forums and very little UNDP operational (as opposed to analysis and coordination) activity?
In any event that line of institutional proposal is the ideal way to unify disparate opponents. 
They will be all the more effective because UNDP's reputation for openness and efficiency is 
by no means uniformly high.
I
UNDP could be more effective if it dropped fund raising (albeit whether it or UNCTAD 
should be the social security fund holder and - more important - chair the group to prepare and 
monitor its 'low conditionality' clauses is one on which reasonable people can disagree) and its 
ongoing direct operational activities. That route would probable reduce politico institutional 
opposition and win friends.
VIII.
Are Official Transfers Central?
Agenda never asks the question but its substance assumes that they are. Since visible trade, 
invisible trade (including migrant remittances) and enterprise capital transfers are all larger - 
the former vastly so - than official transfers for all but a few small poor countries that answer 
is almost surely wrong.
That criticism does not detract from the Social Security-Mutual Interest Contract-Emergency 
triad. But the realisation that trade dominates transfers and enterprise transfers dominate
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official suggests it is imprudent - or at any rate incomplete - to look at official transfers 
independent of trade (GATT/WTO), of first line liquidity provision - exchange rate 
predictability management (IMF's stated role albeit one - arguably wrongly - it has ceased to 
play); enterprise transfers (nominally at least enabling these is of high concern to both 
UNCTAD and the World Bank); macroeconomic coordination (a Bank/Fund, G 20, ECOSOC 
area in which a substitution of UNDP as convenor and addition of UNCTAD as a major player 
might well be desirable).
IX.
Is Development Cooperation Best Ghettoised?
There is an even more basic assumption in Agenda - global economic institutions focused on 
development cooperation are and should be separate or separable from those dealing with 
other issues. Since trade and liquidity cannot be carved up that way the assumption would 
appear to be a non-starter.
Two further considerations arise. Northern countries concentrate attention on institutions 
which serve their priority interests - largely North/North. Therefore, to encapsulate 
development cooperation in separate institutions may - no matter how unintentionally - be to 
marginalise it. The contrast in Northern attitudes and actions vis-a-vis GATT/ITO in contrast 
to UNCTAD speaks volumes on this point.
In addition specialised agencies are not primarily about technical assistance. Their focuses are 
on knowledge production encouragement, analysis, dialogue leading to best practice 
guidelines and cooperation (North-North, South-South, South-North) in implementing them. 
Technical assistance is - or ought to be - a means to these ends not an apologia provita sua.
X.
Liberalism, Equity, Global Coordination, Confederalism
As the labour migration example suggests free market liberalism and equity/poverty reduction 
orientations are frequently in tension. "External economies" may indeed cause "market 
failure" and justify intervention, but misdesigned intervention can lead to policy (or contract) 
failure worse than the pre-existing market failure.
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Yes, external economies do lead to the chances of state intervention /market management 
being efficient in liberal terms. Yes, the ultra liberalism of -e.g. - Nassau Senior who thought 
the Irish potato famine a failure because it did not kill or drive out enough Irish to restore 
economic viability is economically suspect as well as normatively obnoxious and politically 
highly unsaleable in most late 20th Century contexts. But it does not service to the Agenda to 
be so economical with warnings as to the real trade-offs and tension certain to strew the road 
to implementation.
The two main initiatives proposed: global social security and mutual benefit cost sharing 
contacts could go to actual decision taker exploration and initial negotiation agendas very 
quickly; achieve substantial operationality by 2005 and be relatively full in place and run in by 
2010. Neither needs economic confederalism with broad taxation and coercive/judicial 
powers. Helpful as these might be on Social Security finance they are not capable of being 
attained much before 2045 and possibly later. The payment for doing harm proposal on the 
contrary does need enforceable confederalism. Even without that the likelihood of early 
successful negotiation (except in cases in which mutual interest side payments and agreements 
can be devised) would be quite low.
XL
Try and Try Again
Social security and contracts are big ideas. Not precisely new they are forcefully expounded 
here in a form accessible to reflective decision takers and advisors at a time at which they are 
just negotiable. The question is how to recruit enough rabbits - and to keep them in a 
relatively unified column not haring off in all directions.
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